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Status of the idealistic circuit
scheme: Unconditionally
secure; it
has not been cracked. Security proofs for idealistic and various
non-idealistic situations are given in papers [2,3,4,7,10,12,13].
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Status of the practical (non-idealistic)
system
with inaccuracies and stray elements: Hacking, similar to Quantum
Hacking, click to watch link:
A small information leak of raw
bits, similarly
to quantum communicators. The amount of leaking information can be
controlled (Alice
and Bob determine the amount of information Eve can have). The
scheme cannot be
cracked but it can be jammed (similarly to quantum key exchange, when
Eve randomly measures and supplies back a small fraction of photons; an
operation which cannot be detected by Alice and Bob because it yields
too small quantum error rate).
However, for a major difference from quantum communicators, note that
Alice and Bob are fully
aware
of all the information Eve knows. Thus they are in the position
to discard
or manipulate the information Eve has. This is a new situation in
physical cryptography and poses deep questions about the best policy
for Alice and Bob. See below the remarks about information leak and,
for a mathematical security analysis, the last section of paper [10] and paper [13].
- Some of the unique properties
of this secure key exchange scheme:
- Foundation of the security: The
second
law of thermodynamics: the impossibility to construct a perpetual
motion machine of the second kind [2].
- Natural immunity against
the
man-in-the-middle-attack [3].
- Information leak via hacking (types:
Bergou-Scheuer-Yariv; Hao; Kish). In the non-idealistic
system, miniscule information leak may exist, but the information leak
is
under full control by Alice and Bob who knows all the bits Eve may have
correctly extracted. This property is very different from quantum
communicator characteristics and it is only possible in classical
physics because it requires the continuous monitoring of voltage
and
current by Alice and Bob and the comparison of these data via
broadcasting. The information leak of raw bit exchange was 0.19% in the
experimental prototype (see paper [7] below) and Alice and Bob knew all
the information Eve had, in a deterministic fashion. A raw bit leak of
0.19% still needs a privacy amplifier, which is a software tool quantum
communicators use to make cleaner key, however the privacy amplifier
used by KLJN can be a more efficient one utilizing the fact that the
leaked information is exactly known [10].
- Inexpensive, small,
robust,
low power consumption and
it can be
integrated on chips to secure information within computers (click
here).
Papers:
14. L.B. Kish, F. Pepper,
"Information Networks Secured by the Laws of Physics", IEICE (Japan), invited survey paper,
accepted for publication (November 2011); includes the utilization of
powerlines, phone landlines and interet wire lines to build robust
unconditionally secure networks. Click
here to read it.
13. T.
Horvath, L.B. Kish, J. Scheuer, "Effective Privacy Amplification for
Secure Classical Communications", EPL
(former Europhysics Letters) 94
(2011) 28002-p1 - 28002-p6. Click
here to read it.
Left to
right: Robert Mingesz, Laszlo Kish, Zoltan Gingl at the
University of Szeged, Hungary, 12/15/2006; After the successful
experimental demo of the Szegedin
Whisper Project
testing all known breaking attemps, including the man-in-the-middle
attack during the very first run (quantum encryption is vulnerable
against such), and thus proving superior-to-quantum security.
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